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his essay examines Arne Naess’s conception of the ecological self in 
onnection with the work of ecofeminist Val Plumwood and claims that 
aess’s thought is able to avoid some of the criticisms of deep ecology 
hat Plumwood voices. Following an analysis of Plumwood’s position, 
t is argued that Naess does not subscribe to what Plumwood terms the 
indistinguishability thesis,” but that the notion of identification 
ppears problematic due to its tendency to emphasize sameness in 
elations to others. The paper ends with a discussion of comments made 
y Naess in a recent interview that can be seen to respond to this 
roblem.1
ntroduction 
cofeminism and deep ecology have been in dialogue for some time 
ow, and while the debate between them has been very fruitful over the 
ears, the exploration of their relationship remains important. This is 
articularly true for those interested in the idea of an ‘ecological self,’ 
ecause the exchange between deep ecologists and ecofeminists has 
ade significant contributions, both to our understanding of the 
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relevance of questions of selfhood for environmentalism, and to our 
understanding of the complexities that such questions involve. 
Ecofeminists and deep ecologists often diverge, however, in their 
accounts of the ecological self, and at times this divergence appears to 
be so sharp that one may legitimately wonder if these philosophical 
streams could ever convene. 
Although there are, admittedly, important differences between 
ecofeminism and deep ecology, it is my contention that the notion of 
the ecological self as articulated by Arne Naess is potentially 
compatible with the work of some ecofeminists, and that certain 
ecofeminist objections to deep ecology do not appear to be applicable to 
Naess’s view. To demonstrate this, I examine Naess’s account of the 
ecological self in conjunction with the work of Val Plumwood.2 I begin 
with a review of Plumwood’s analysis of dualism and its role in the 
egoist understanding of the self and discuss her version of the 
‘relational self’ that is proposed as an alternative to it. Next, I examine 
aspects of Plumwood’s critique of deep ecology and Naess, paying 
attention to the ways in which her analysis of dualism—particularly the 
concept of “incorporation”—figures in this critique. Drawing on a 
number of Naess’s works, I argue that his version of the ecological self 
avoids several of the mistakes Plumwood points out, but that his 
emphasis on “identification” remains problematic from an ecofeminist 
standpoint due to its over-emphasis on similarity and sameness as the 
basis of respect for others. I conclude by suggesting that certain 
comments that Naess made during an interview that I recently 
conducted with him can address this issue. 
I. Dualism and Self/Other Relations 
Unlike a lot of deep ecologists, some ecofeminists have made the 
concept of dualism an integral part of their analyses of the self and its 
relations to others. Dualism is often discussed by ecofeminists in terms 
of ‘value dualisms,’ which conceptually organize the world in terms of 
disjunctive pairs and place greater value on one of the disjuncts.3 Such 
disjunctive pairs have included, among others, reason/emotion, 
male/female, and human/nature. Plumwood expands this analysis, 
however, identifying five features of dualism that make it “more than a 
relation of dichotomy, difference, or non-identity, and more than a 
simple hierarchical relationship.”4 These features are backgrounding, 
radical exclusion, incorporation, instrumentalization, and 
homogenization.  
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“Backgrounding” signifies the refusal of dualism to recognize that the 
devalued term of a disjunctive pair contributes in any important way to 
the privileged term. Strategies for backgrounding can include 
downplaying the contributions of the ‘lower’ disjunct, or simply 
refusing to acknowledge any contribution whatsoever. “Radical 
exclusion” or “hyperseparation” refers to dualism’s attempts to magnify 
the differences between disjuncts, which promotes a view of them as 
different not merely in degree but in kind. “Homogenization,” as a 
corollary of radical exclusion, involves minimizing differences among 
those associated with the devalued class of terms, thus helping to 
confirm the binarism of dualism and to ensure that the members of the 
devalued class are regarded as having a common ‘nature’ that warrants 
similar treatment. “Incorporation” or “relational definition” describes 
the manner in which the characteristics or virtues associated with one 
side of the dualism are taken as primary, and the other side is defined in 
terms of its lack of these qualities. In this scheme, one disjunct is either 
devalued because of its failure to meet the standards set by the 
privileged side, or recognized only if it can be made to conform to those 
standards; difference is not tolerated, and any failure to be ‘a part of’ or 
‘like’ the privileged side results in exclusion. A corollary to 
incorporation, “instrumentalization” views those associated with the 
inferiorized pole of the dualism as having meaning, purpose or function 
solely in relation to those which are privileged, treating the ends, goals, 
or activities of the former as instruments to the activities of the latter.5
These features of dualism fall into two categories: those that deny the 
relation and continuity between disjuncts, and those that deny the 
independence of that which stands at the inferiorized pole of the 
dualism, both of which are evident in self/other dualism and the 
definition of the self in terms of egoistic individualism. On the egoist 
model, “no internal relations of interest or desire bind people to one 
another, and primary goal sets are exclusive, without overlap.” Thus the 
egoist self is hyperseparated from others, regarding its ends as entirely 
self-contained, discrete, having “no non-eliminable reference to or 
overlap with the welfare or desires of others.”6 In addition to exclusion, 
this model exhibits features of incorporation, viewing others as having 
ends that are valuable only when conjoined with those of the self: 
insofar as egoism presumes interests to be discrete and to concern only 
the self, others will be regarded either as obstacles to the self’s projects, 
or positively acknowledged only if it is shown that they are somehow 
important to the satisfaction of the self’s own interests. That is, others 
are recognized only when they are “assimilated to the self, or 
incorporated into the self and its systems of desires and needs.”7
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The alternative to the dualistically defined self is variously referred to 
by ecofeminists as the ‘self-in-relationship,’ ‘relational self’ or, 
specifically referring to the connections between the self and the natural 
world, the ‘ecological self.’ Talk of a ‘relational self’ is not meant to 
imply, though, that the dualistically conceived self is devoid of 
relations. Rather, it is a self that relates to others through the lens of 
dualism, and thus the relational self stands as an attempt to redefine 
relations between self and other by reversing dualism’s patterns. 
Such a reversal requires, in the first place, an understanding of the self 
as “essentially related and interdependent, and the development of the 
self as taking place through involvement and interaction with the 
other.”8 This acknowledgement of the contributions of others to the self 
and rejection of the hyperseparation of self and other further involves 
the recognition that the self has “interdependent interests and needs 
which make essential and not merely accidental or contingent reference 
to those of others.”9 This is to say that the interests of others are not to 
be regarded as exclusive of those of the self, and the pursuit of others’ 
flourishing should not be viewed as only contingently connected to that 
of the self. It is rather the case that neither can be sought in isolation 
from the other. 
Acknowledging the relationship between and the dependence of self 
upon the other, however, is only one half of what is needed in response 
to dualized self/other constructions. This is because “recognizing 
relationality, embedment, and continuity overcomes hyperseparation of 
selves, but does nothing to counter incorporation, the definition of the 
other in terms of the self’s realm of agency.”10 Consequently, the 
resolution of dualism requires a double movement  
to recognize both the relationship and continuity denied by backgrounding and 
radical exclusion, and also to affirm the difference and independence of the other 
denied by incorporation and the definition of the other in relation to the self as lack 
and as instrument.11  
This demand for an affirmation of otherness requires that we recognize 
self and other as “distinct centers of striving and resistance,” as 
relatively distinct beings with relatively distinct and potentially 
dissimilar needs.12 Without such a recognition, the logic of dualism is 
not adequately challenged, and the danger of a self that colonizes others 
remains. 
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II. Arne Naess and the Self of Deep Ecology 
While ecofeminists have certainly made reference to the ecological self, 
the term is most often connected to the philosophical perspective of 
deep ecology, something that might be explained by the fact that many 
ecofeminists have expressed serious reservations about deep ecologists’ 
portrayals of the ecological self, and voiced concerns about the process 
of ‘identification’ that is often promoted as the means to its 
realization.13 In Plumwood’s own critique of deep ecology, she argues 
that deep ecologists’ discussions of the self and its relations to others 
tend to reflect problems of the “distortion of difference associated with 
incorporation,”14 which is to say that deep ecologists tend to construe 
otherness in ways that assimilate difference and bring others into the 
sphere of the self. Let us turn, then, to consider the thought of Arne 
Naess in light of several variants of this critique, beginning with a look 
at Plumwood’s discussions of the “indistinguishable self.”15
A. Ontological Indistinguishability 
As the name suggests, the “indistinguishable self” is a self that regards 
itself as entirely indistinct from others; it is a self that “rejects 
boundaries between self and nature.”16 Plumwood’s claim here is that 
deep ecologists seek to redress the bifurcation between self and other, 
humans and nature, by developing an ontology that involves “the 
obliteration of distinction”17 between them, a viewpoint in which self 
and other belong to a “seamless whole.”18 On this telling, to ‘identify’ 
with an other amounts to erasing its difference from the self, seeing the 
other as ontologically indistinct from the self. Plumwood cites several 
deep ecologists, including Naess, who lean toward this ontology of the 
One, and promote an excessively holistic or gestalt outlook that, in 
Warwick Fox’s words, “dissolves not only the man-in-environment 
concept, but every compact thing-in-milieu concept.”19 This sort of 
“indistinguishability” represents a clear case of incorporation, for 
although it firmly rejects the radical separation of self and other, it fails 
to acknowledge the other’s independence from the self. Instead of 
seeing self and other as essentially related this view posits that they are 
merged into an all-encompassing, capital S “Self” in which the 
otherness of the other is lost. 
Is Naess a proponent of such a self? In beginning to formulate a 
response to this question, we should first acknowledge that Naess does 
indeed speak in some of the terms cited by Plumwood, espousing the 
“relational, total-field image” and rejecting the “compact thing-in-
milieu concept.”20 It is not certain, though, that his articulation of this 
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position commits the error of the indistinguishability thesis. In Ecology, 
Community and Lifestyle, for example, he praises “relationalism” for its 
ability to “undermine the belief in organisms or persons as something 
which can be isolated from their milieux,” arguing against the idea that 
such things are “completely separable” from the networks of relations in 
which they exist.21 That is, existents are not radically isolatable in the 
way that the “compact thing” model suggests; they are not discrete 
entities whose relations are accidental to what they are. 
This explains why, in his numerous discussions of gestalts and 
gestaltism, Naess frequently warns of the problems with the language of 
“parts” and “wholes,” and entreats us to “think more strenuously about 
the relation between wholes and parts.”22 Instead of “parts” and 
“wholes,” he suggests that we talk in terms of “subordinate” and 
“superordinate” gestalts in an attempt to rid ourselves of the notion that 
there are “parts” understood as “completely separable” elements.23 It 
also explains why, in his continual search for new formulations of the 
old gestaltist motto, “The whole is greater than the sum of its parts,” 
Naess suggests that an acceptable alternative is, “The part is more than 
a part.”24 For Naess, “parts” must be understood in the context of 
relationships, and thus his gestaltism is in part an attempt to promote 
the view that individuals are what they are by virtue of their relations to 
others. 
Embracing relationalism, however, does not mean that individuals are 
erased and one is left only with “wholes.” Naess’s attempts to avoid 
such a holism are evident in various places: at one point he says that to 
claim that humans are a “part” of nature in the sense of being “drops in 
the stream of life” could be “misleading if it implies that individuality 
of the drops is lost in the stream.”25 In another place he says that 
identification does not transform self and other into an indistinct “mass” 
or “one single, integrated being.”26 In what is perhaps his most telling 
comment on the subject, Naess says that in his understanding of 
gestaltism,  
the whole is more than the parts, but also the parts are more than the whole, 
because there’s nothing left if you just have the whole. You have to continue, like 
in the nature mysticism of Spinoza, to keep the most subordinate gestalt you have. 
You keep them all. You cannot say, “Now I am free of the particulars.”27  
Here we find Naess again cautioning against a superficial reading of the 
holism of gestaltism, and continuing to refer to the individual elements 
of gestalts as “subordinate gestalts,” but we also find a clear refusal to 
regard parts as being dispersed into wholes in such a way as to lose 
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their individuality. Indeed, true to the lessons of gestalt theory, for 
Naess, the absence of differentiation between parts does not leave one 
with a homogenous whole, but rather nothing at all—“there’s nothing 
left if you just have the whole.” Hence while there are no “parts” that 
exist completely independently of relations, it is equally true that there 
are no “wholes” in the absence of relatively distinct parts—one is never 
“free of the particulars.” Thus we can see that, for Naess, a gestaltist 
conception of self and other, humans and nature, denies neither 
relationships nor the differences between those in relation. 
B. Interest Indistinguishability 
Yet even if Naess may not be subject to the criticism that he views self 
and other as ontologically indistinct, Plumwood fears that he may still 
subscribe to a thesis of interest indistinguishability, the position that 
“selves may not be fused, but interests are.”28 To embrace this version 
of the indistinguishability thesis would be to claim that when one 
identifies with an other, one comes to recognize that its needs or 
interests are identical to one’s own, a view which would again represent 
a case of incorporation insofar as it fails to respect the other’s 
difference from the self: denying that the other’s needs are relatively 
distinct from those of the self. And this failure shows itself to be 
particularly problematic if we keep in mind Plumwood’s observation 
that the indistinguishability thesis assumes that the union of self and 
other will guarantee respectful treatment of the other since the self will 
take the other’s needs as its own, “but there is nothing to guarantee 
this—one could equally well take one’s own needs for its.”29
The problem of ‘interest indistinguishability’ in Naess’s work arises 
specifically in relation to his formal definition of identification: 
identification is “a spontaneous, non-rational but not irrational process 
through which the interest or interests of another being are reacted to as 
our own interest or interests.”30 While this statement is open to a variety 
of interpretations, it is true that Naess sometimes precises it in the 
direction criticized by Plumwood. In his reply to Peter Reed, for 
example, he claims that when one is identified with others one “is not 
aware of . . . interests as being potentially different.”31 Elsewhere, 
though, he writes that “[a] high level of identification does not 
eliminate conflicts of interest,”32 which suggests that, in identification, 
the interests of self and other remain distinct, perhaps even sharply so. 
There is an obvious tension here, but it is one that might be resolved if 
we were to situate Naess’s understanding of identification in the 
phenomenological context from which it appears to be derived. In his 
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debate with Alfred Ayer, Naess explained his use of the term 
“identification” by hypothetically positing that he responded 
empathetically to Ayer’s being hurt, and described this situation by 
saying that “phenomenologically there would be ‘one’ hurt, which was 
not yet ‘my’ experience.”33 The latter half of this claim (that the hurt is 
“not yet ‘my’ experience”) highlights for us the tendency to analyze 
experience in terms that sever self and other and treat them as having 
essentially isolated interests, while the former (that “there would be 
‘one’ hurt”) suggests that a more phenomenologically accurate analysis 
would describe a situation of ‘feeling-with’ in which one is not 
disconnected from the trials of the other. Something strikingly similar is 
expressed when Naess says that one might reformulate the claim, “This 
place is part of myself” by saying, “If this place is destroyed something 
in me is destroyed.”34 In this formulation, it is not that what happens to 
the other is identical to what happens to the self, but rather that the self 
is not indifferent to what happens to others, that the well being of others 
is experienced as essentially (and not accidentally) bound up with that 
of oneself. These phenomenological reflections lead, then, neither to an 
account of self and other as individuals whose interests are entirely 
discrete, nor to an account in which the interests of self and other are 
completely merged. What we are lead to is, instead, a relational account 
of the self in which self and other are intertwined such that their 
flourishing cannot be radically isolated, where the other’s attainment of 
its ends is experienced as an integral part of the self’s own well being. 
C. Identification and Similarity 
But even if Naess’s version of identification does not propose that the 
interests of self and other are indistinct, it clearly emphasizes the ways 
in which they are similar. This is particularly apparent in his oft-
repeated story of witnessing the death of a flea that had jumped into 
some acid on a microscope slide. Recalling his empathic reaction to the 
scene, Naess claims that his response was made possible by the fact that 
he saw in the flea something like himself: “If I had been alienated from 
the flea,” he reports, “not seeing intuitively anything even resembling 
myself, the death struggle would have left me feeling indifferent.”35 
This ‘resemblance’ is not mere physical likeness, but rather the 
resemblance of the other’s needs to one’s own, a point made clear in 
another of Naess’s examples in which children are encouraged to see 
that the ‘preferences’ of an insect are akin to theirs.36 Hence we can see 
that the term “identification” is not meant to function simply as a 
description of the inter-relation of self and other, but as an explanation 
of how such mutuality is possible: identification is the recognition that 
there is in others “something similar or identical with oneself” that 
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allows for one to respond to them in certain ways, which is why we are 
told that “solidarity with others already presupposes a process of 
identification.”37
Ultimately, therefore, this view still represents a kind of incorporation 
insofar as it proposes that others must be significantly similar to the self 
to warrant respectful treatment. It proposes, that is, that those to whom 
one is not indifferent are those whose interests are thought to resemble 
one’s own, and this is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it 
seems to limit involvement with others who are so different that one 
cannot readily discern in them interests similar to one’s own, or even 
interests at all (a point that is particularly relevant when we are asking 
about involvement with other-than-human others). Second, it too 
quickly assimilates or incorporates the differing needs of others to a 
framework that assumes that those needs are fundamentally similar to 
those of the self, and thus responds to others on a presumed similarity 
of interests. But interests are not always so similar—even among those 
beings that would elicit the sort of identification described here. 
III. The Self of Stars and Stone 
Thus far, we have suggested that even though Naess avoids some of the 
problems associated with the incorporation of others, his thinking about 
the basis of relationships and how they flourish apparently does not, 
emphasizing the ways in which the self ‘sees itself in others’ but 
neglecting the ways in which the self sees, and responds to, others as 
other. Recently, however, I had the opportunity to interview Naess at 
his home in Norway, and I would like to finish with some reflections on 
comments that he made that I believe can respond to this problem. 
At one point in our talks, I asked Naess to say a few words about the 
ecological self. In his writings, of course, the ecological self is often 
discussed in conjunction with identification, but instead of turning the 
conversation in that direction, he described some of the experiences that 
inform his thinking about the self.  
At Tvergastein I have the experience that Tvergastein does not belong to me but I 
belong to it. Of course Tvergastein is alive, and the stars are just outside the 
window of my hut, and they peek in at night. My relation to these things is 
intimate, internal; they are part of myself. So I start from this oneness.38  
A few moments later, Naess said again that for him the rocks at 
Tvergastein were “alive,” and explained that this belief was in part 
inspired by his appreciation of their life histories: 
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There are some very big rocks near my hut at Tvergastein—they are a part of 
Hallingskarvet—and I was interested in why they were there. There are large 
fissures in the rock above Tvergastein, and they expand as water freezes in them. 
Every year they grow a little, and after so many years the rocks fall down. 
Gradually they lose their very nice position at the top of the mountain with a 
tremendous view, and tumble down to a flat place. Learning about the history of 
these big stones near the hut and what has happened to them—it’s a way of 
experiencing even rocks as alive. 
One could, of course, take this as an example of the sort of thinking of 
which we have been critical, presuming a great degree of similarity 
between self and stones (i.e., that the stones are others whose 
experience is structured in manner similar to that of the self). However, 
when I asked about the seeming anthropomorphism of these comments, 
Naess said, “People say I am unduly anthropomorphic, ‘humanizing’ 
the stone. But in another way I am also ‘stoning’ the human. The 
movement is mutual; it goes the other way also.” The significance of 
this remark is that it emphasizes that self and other are mutually 
defining in a way that the notion of identification does not, for although 
it maintains that one ‘sees oneself in the other,’ it clearly rejects that 
this movement is one-directional: one both ‘sees oneself in the other’ 
and ‘sees the other in the self,’ understanding that it is not only the self 
that defines others but that others are defining of the self, being 
productive or revelatory of certain dimensions of the self. 
But perhaps even more important than this affirmation of the ability of 
others to define the self, Naess’s remarks also appeared to me to affirm 
the otherness of those with whom the self is in relation. “I have known 
the rocks at Tvergastein since I was very young,” he told me, “and they 
look at me. I look at them and they look at me.” A short while later he 
said:  
With the stones at Tvergastein, how could I possibly move them? I am something 
that contains in me those stones, and have for so many years, that I couldn’t 
possibly move them. As I feel the sense of belonging to Tvergastein my 
motivation is always, without any reflection, adapted to this feeling of being-there-
together. 39  
Here the stones are spoken of not as “one” with the self, nor as beings 
who have interests akin to the self that elicit an empathic response. 
Rather, they “look,” which is to say that they approach the self from 
across a distance, from ‘foreign soil.’ To call these beings “alive” is not 
to demand that we think of them in the same terms as the biologically 
living; it is to assert that they are active forces in the world, expressive 
entities that exert a kind of ‘elemental influence’ on their surroundings, 
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imposing themselves on the landscape and making certain demands of 
those in their presence. These are beings that tell different stories and 
present different perspectives that must be taken into account, 
navigated, and integrated into the life of the self; they are others whose 
unique patterns and ways of being shape those of the self. And the 
ecological self is the self that is in dialogue with these differences, the 
self that does not carve its name on things but is itself carved out by 
them, “contains” them. This is a self that has ‘internalized’ its relations 
to the world such that it can only be portrayed as a being who has as its 
very mode of being “being-there-together.” 
These remarks begin to show us, therefore, a version of the self that 
recognizes others as other, as unique presences with a certain density, 
an opacity in relation to which the self’s own boundaries are shaped and 
defined. It is a model of ecological selfhood that, in Plumwood’s words, 
allows for both “the tension of sameness and difference” and for “the 
other to play an active role in the creation of self in discovery and 
interaction with the world.”40 Such a self is perhaps not best described 
in terms of identification, but as a self that, as Naess put it, is “together” 
with others, “intimate” with a multitude of beings. Let us conclude, 
then, by following Naess’s lead and suggesting that the ecological self 
is a self that is formed in intimate contact with myriad others, from 
those who dwell upon rocky soils to those encountered in the starry 
skies; it is a self of stars and stone. 
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